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Constitutionalism in the Horn of Africa: Lesson from the new 
constitution of Ethiopia1 
 
Berhanu Gutema Balcha2 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
A New Constitution was ratified in December 1994 and adopted in May 1995 and put 
into effect on 22 August 1995. The constitution officially endorses the ethnic federal 
restructuring in the country by declaring the establishment of a federal and democratic 
structure and establishment of nine regional states by declaring that sovereign power 
should reside with the ‘nations, nationalities and peoples’ of Ethiopia  (Article 1, 8, and 
47, the 1994 Ethiopian Constitution).  
 
The constitution included crucial human and democratic rights provisions based on the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations, which declared for 
unconditional respect of human rights.  Notably, it claimed to have the beginning of a 
new chapter in Ethiopian history in which ‘each nation, nationality and people have the 
right to administer its own affairs within its own defined territory and effectively 
participate in the central government on the basis of freedom, and fair and proper 
representation’. Although the formal recognition of ethnic diversity and equal treatment 
of all ethnic groups had become the core principle of the constitution, it remains to be 
seen how far this constitutional rhetoric is really successful in transforming the 
Ethiopian state into a workable federal model. Close exploration and examination of the 
constitution below will indicate whether the federal arrangement in Ethiopia has been 
founded on a genuine covenant or agreement.  
 
 
 
                                                          
1  This paper was presented at the Horn of Africa Workshop: What is the Way out: Challenges in 
Overcoming Governance Crises, Endemic Conflicts and Negative External Involvements in the 
Horn of Africa? The workshop took place May 26, 2008 at Aalborg University and was hosted by 
Development, Innovation and International Political Economy Research (DIIPER) in Collaboration 
with Centre for Comparative Integration Studies (CCIS), Aalborg University. 
2  Berhanu Gutema Balcha holds a PhD on ”The Making of the State in Africa: The Experiment of 
‘Ethnic-Federal’ Decentralisation in Ethiopia” from DIR – Research Center on Development and 
International Relations, Aalborg University. 
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2. Constitutional distribution of power 
The constitution declares for the establishment of a parliamentarian system of 
governance that has a two-chamber parliament at the federal level, namely House of 
People Representative (HPR) and House of Federation (HF) (Article 45). HPR is the 
federal legislative body, which has the supreme authority. Its members are elected for a 
term of five years by a system of a plurality of votes cast from each electoral district or 
constituency that has 100,000 populations. It has about 547 seats and the constitution put 
a limit on the number of seats of the HPR not to exceed 550.  
 
The HPR is granted a full power of legislation in all matters assigned to the federal 
jurisdiction by the constitution (Article 55). The second chamber, which is called the 
House of Federation (HF), is composed of representatives of Nations, Nationalities and 
Peoples’ (Article 61). It can be simply called as a house of nationalities or house of 
ethnic groups. According to the constitution (Article 61) that: ‘Each Nation, Nationality 
and People shall be represented in the House of the Federation by at least one member. 
Each Nation or Nationality shall be represented by one additional representative for each 
one million of its population’.  
  
Constitutionally, the HF has the power to interpret the Constitution and organize the 
council of constitutional inquiry (Article 62). Other major powers and functions of the 
HF include, making of decision on issues relating to the rights of Nations, Nationalities 
and Peoples to self-determination, including the right to secession; promote the equality 
of the Peoples of Ethiopia enshrined in the Constitution and promote and consolidate 
their unity based on their mutual consent; make every effort to find solutions to disputes 
or misunderstandings that may arise between States; determine the division of revenues 
derived from joint Federal and State tax sources and the subsidies that the Federal 
Government may provide to the States; determine Federal intervention if any State, in 
violation of this Constitution, endangers the constitutional order (Article 62). 
 
Although the constitution allocates very vital powers and responsibilities to the HF, its 
ability to exercise its power has been impaired by the same constitution that permits the 
HF to establish permanent and ad hoc committees to exercise most of its power and 
functions and the constitution does not require the HF to have frequent sessions, rather it 
requires the HF to have at least two sessions annually (Article 67). Thus, the HF is 
exercising most of its power and functions through by few individuals working in the 
committees without making frequent consultation and decision of the whole member of 
the HF. The weak role of the HF has created an opportunity for concentration of power 
on the winner party in the federal government.  
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In addition, the procedure of representation in the HF allows more populous ethnic 
groups to have more representative in the house, and this means that they have more 
votes to than the smaller populous ethnic groups represented in the HF, as it is the case 
in the first legislative chamber, the HPR. As a result, more populous ethnic groups have 
more seats in both houses and thus more populous ethnic groups have a better 
(constitutional) power to protect their interest. This makes a case for the critiques that 
there is always huge difficulties to guarantee ethnic equality in Ethiopia in a 
straightforward manner. As this shows that in the Ethiopian federal system, both houses 
are apparently structured for proportional representation, but in many other federal 
systems, the first chamber is for a proportional representation and the second one is for 
an equal representation. Moreover, in the case of Ethiopia, the second chamber, namely 
the HF is not functioning as a legislative body, it is not involved in lawmaking process 
and it does not have regular session. As a result, it is very difficult to consider the 
federal system in Ethiopia as bicameral, thus it may be a noticeable deviation from the 
conventional federal principle that recognizes bicameral legislative structures as an 
inherent feature of the federal system (Lijphart 1977) (Davis 1978: 142). Besides, the 
second chamber is serving as ‘the house of every nationalities’ or a chamber for every 
ethnic groups in the country (Fasil 1997: 72). This shows evidence of the insignificant 
influence of the ethnic groups (as a group) in the legislative, policymaking and other 
important decision-making process in Ethiopia, wherein the Constitution declares, 
‘sovereign power resides in the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia (Article 8, 
1). 
 
Besides the very fact that the regional state’s councils have the power to elect members 
of the HF, would also be disadvantageous for an ethnic group or ethnic constituency that 
elects an opposition candidate. Moreover, state councils in majority of the regional states 
are very weak and have very limited sessions per annum, thus in such situation the 
executive body of the regional states always have a tremendous power and influence in 
sending regional representatives for the HF. This practice could diminish a check and 
balance system that could be very essential in multiethnic societies in which political 
competition is positioned around ethnic lines.  
 
Putting aside the operational deficiencies on the ground, a paradoxical constitutional 
decree has made the HF flimsy and ineffectual; the constitution can be criticized for its 
inconsistency in giving the HF very substantial power and functions such as interpreting 
the constitution, determining the division of revenues and subsidies to regional states 
and making of decision on issues relating to self-determination, including the right to 
4  
secession, whereas making the HF highly dependent on the states’ councils and for that 
matter, as argued above, making it dependent on the executive bodies at the regional and 
the federal government levels. This phenomenon deprives the Ethiopian federal system 
the exclusive hallmark of a federal system, which is a division or separation of power 
(King 1982: 94). This may be a deliberate attempt by the framers of the constitution who 
foresee the difficulties in handling and satisfying various self-seeking and provincial 
demands of ethnic groups. However, in the absence of check and balance mechanisms, 
the political process could be easily abused by the ruling power to protect its own self-
seeking and provincial interest. As Horowitz argues that constitutional designs have 
effects on the distribution of power, and those who gain power as a result may wish to 
alter the design to favor themselves (Horowitz 2002: 33).  
 
The constitution states that the members of the HF are either elected by the state 
councils or elected by the people directly, however in the actual experience it has been 
the states’ council that appoints their respective members in the HF. This means that the 
majority party in the states’ councils has also a power to influence the HF in the federal 
government. This also shows the level of power concentration in the hands of a single 
winner party. In the current one-party dominant political process in Ethiopia, the EPRDF 
has used such constitutional loophole for its advantage to impose its power and also to 
protect its parochial interest in all level of the federal and regional power structures.  The 
integrity of the constitutional design depends on the integrity of demarcating the 
boundary since ‘the looser the design and the easier the adoption, the easier the 
alteration as well (Ibid. p. 32).  
 
The constitution grants equal powers and responsibilities to the various regional states as 
it states that ‘Member States of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia shall have 
equal rights and powers’ (Article 47). This entails that the Ethiopian federal system is 
constitutionally designed to be a symmetrical federal system. Each regional state has 
state council that function as the legislative body of the regional government. A 
president who is elected by the state council leads an executive power in all of the 
regional states. The Constitution (Article 52) reserves all powers to the states except 
those given expressly to the federal government alone, or concurrently to the federal and 
regional governments. Some of the major powers and functions entrusted to the regional 
states include: 
To establish a State administration that best advances self-government, a democratic 
order based on the rule of law; to protect and defend the Federal Constitution; 
 
• To enact and execute the state constitution and other laws; 
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• To formulate and execute economic, social and development policies, strategies and 
plans of the State; 
• To administer land and other natural resources in accordance with Federal laws; 
• To levy and collect taxes and duties on revenue sources reserved to the States and to 
draw up and administer the State budget; 
• To enact and enforce laws on the State civil service and their condition of work; in the 
implementation of this responsibility it shall ensure that educational; training and 
experience requirements for any job, title or position approximate national standards; 
• To establish and administer a state police force, and to maintain public order and 
peace within the state. 
 
Constitutionally, it appears very difficult to reduce or alter the power and function of 
any of the regional states unless the council of the concerned regional state concedes to 
the alteration of its power, which is of course a very unusual scenario. The constitution 
puts a strong protection against any easy alternation or amendment of the constitution. 
Any proposal for constitutional amendment should be supported by a two-thirds 
majority vote of a joint session of the HPR and the HF, and should also be approved by 
a two-thirds of the Councils of the member States of the Federation by majority votes 
(Article 105). More strictly, amendment to Chapter three of the Constitution that 
contains human rights and democratic rights including the rights of nations, 
nationalities, and peoples and, the provision which deals with amendment of the 
constitution, require the approval of all state councils by a majority vote and the 
approval of the HPR and HF by a two- thirds majority vote. In this regard, the 
constitutional approach in Ethiopia is in accordance with the basic federal principle that 
requires the consent of a very bigger majority group in constitutional alteration (King 
1982; Elazar 1995; Watts 2000).   
 
Nonetheless, it is one thing to put the provisions in the constitution and another to 
genuinely pursue them. As Leenco anticipated that the TPLF can afford to be quite 
generous on paper since it will not be bound by those aspects of any legislation that 
appear to restrain its freedom to act with impunity, (Leenco 1999: 11). Despite a gesture 
to devolve power to the regional states and local self-government units, the process has 
been marked by a centralization of power at the center that was overwhelmingly 
dominated by the TPLF (Young 1998: 321; Clapham 2002: 26; Merera 2003: 121). Due 
to the concentration of power on the TPLF/EPRDF, the exercise of power from the 
federal government to the woreda and kebele administrative structures has been flowing 
through the centralized TPLF/ EPRDF’s party network, thus the declarations in the 
constitution do not reflect the actual power exercise in Ethiopia’s federal system.  
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Moreover, the higher centripetal character of the federal system in Ethiopia could also 
be gleaned from the concentration of policymaking power on the federal government, 
the concentration of financial power and budget allocation responsibility on the federal 
government and a weak capacity of the regional states in terms of skilled manpower 
(Vaughan and Tronvoll 2003: 12). Abbink (1998:167) also claims that the actual 
division of powers between member states and federal government in Ethiopia is ‘not 
federal enough’ because the states do not have any role in debating the policies and in 
proposing legislation formulated at the federal level. He justifies this claim by pointing 
at the fact that other federal systems, such as the German, Canadian, Nigerian and 
Mexican, have given more power of this kind to the member states.  Moreover, in issues 
concerning constitutional disputes, the regional states have a very insignificant 
constitutional role to challenge decisions made by the HF and Council of Constitutional 
Inquiry, which are structured within the jurisdiction of the federal government in which 
the federal executive particularly the PM has a tremendous power to influence their 
deliberation and operation.  
 
 
3. Article 39: The right to establish self-government or the right to secede  
Article 39 declares an unconditional right to self-determination, including the right to 
secession of every nation, nationality and peoples in Ethiopia. According to the 
constitution, ‘nation, nationalities or people symbolizes ‘a group of people who have or 
share large measure of a common culture or similar customs, mutual intelligibility of 
language, belief in a common or related identities, a common psychological make-up, 
and who inhabit an identifiable, predominantly contiguous territory’ (Article 39, 5). 
Evidently, this contradicts the federal solution that aims to deter secession.  According 
to Henze (1995: 35) that ‘the right to secede’ in Ethiopia constitution is narrowly 
specified without exhaustively elaborating various options of self-determination that 
could be more logical, practicable and humble than the destructive and impracticable 
‘the right to secession’ cliché. Henze indicates experience in Spain in which autonomous 
communities are granted broader power of various magnitudes through a process of 
deliberation and bargaining in order to avoid the possibility of separation or secession. 
For Duchacek (1987: 207), the inclusion of the rights for secession in the federal bargain 
would facilitate the dissolution of the federal framework by encouraging centrifugal 
tendencies, but the right of secession would go along more with a confederal 
arrangement in which parts are completely autonomous to leave the confederation with 
very less difficulties and insignificant harm to each other.  
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The insertion of the right for secession promises in the constitution may be clichéd from 
the USSR constitution that put the same right in the constitution but without any 
practicability after the independence of Finland. At the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, 
the Russian federation emerged with a constitution of 1992 that allowed the right to 
secede as a heir of the USSR, but the 1993 constitution scrapped the right to secede and 
opted for a process of asymmetrical and separate arrangement with every ethnic territory 
for negotiated power sharing arrangements in order to deter the destructive burden of 
secessionism (Smith 2000).  Many federal arrangements such as Canada and 
Switzerland have embarked on granting feasible and fair broader local autonomy 
arrangements in order to discourage centrifugal tendencies. In the contrary, the 
Ethiopia’s constitutional pledges for secession; it puts a very audacious promise for ‘a 
right to secede’, but in reality the power holders are doing very little to promote genuine 
and feasible self-administrative structures that would discourage a pointer to the 
constitutional promise of secessionists’ bonfire. Rather, the Ethiopian federal experience 
matches the ex-Soviet Union constitution that gave copious promises of self-
determination including independence for its ethnic republics but responded with 
ruthless force when the rights were requested. To some extent, the same may be true in 
Ethiopia’s federal constitution, which is rich and overflowing in freedom vocabularies 
but the actual performance is very far and opposite to the declarations. But the danger 
could be very great in situation which official pronouncement provokes and makes 
cognizant parochial ethnic consciousness by reckless advertisement of the right to 
secede, whereas official actions are going in opposite and extreme directions of 
subjugation and curtailment of ordinary rights and freedoms which of course reinforce 
and justify the demand for secession.  
 
Moreover, unfulfilled flashy and celebrated promises could create a strong adverse 
reaction than discreetly and slightly presented ones since undelivered promise may 
generate more powerful resentment than the non-promised ones. In situation where the 
power and the resource of the regional governments are subordinate and dependent to 
the federal government at the center, the right to secede rhetoric could simply provide an 
incentive and justification to demand for secession. The regional governments in 
Ethiopia’s federal arrangement are highly dependent on the federal government; they 
operate in a manner that resembles a centralized administration.  The federal 
government has a supreme power to decide on land and natural resources, it appropriates 
huge tax bases, and it owns most of the nation’s industrial establishments. Besides, 
many of the ethnic groups are not exercising most of their rights listed in article 39, 
whereas a few are enjoying more than what they actually deserve. Therefore, with such 
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sorry milieu that breeds and exacerbates resentments, the right to secede cliché can 
become a recipe for disaster.  
 
Paradoxically, in Ethiopian, the ruling group, which is dominated by a minority ethnic 
group from an impoverished region, has an unfair control over politics and economics 
nationwide. At the same time, the same ruling group promises the right to secede for the 
various ethnic groups who are relatively better endowed with resources. However, it 
denies an authentic representation of these ethnic groups. Instead, it uses surrogate 
groups and elites to maneuver and control ethnic groups. It is, however, becoming very 
difficult to sustain the proxy system for long in an efficient and credible manner. As it is 
accounted that many of proxy officials ‘tend to be undisciplined and corrupt, which 
occasionally resulted in massive dismissal and demotions’ (Merera 2003: 141).  
 
Furthermore, there is a procedural confusion regarding the constitutional provision that 
allows the right to every ethnic group to establish institutions of government in the 
territory that it inhabits and the right to establish, at any time, their own regional state.  
The insertion of very ambiguous and complex procedures would make the right 
meaningless and the intention insincere. The constitution states that the demand for 
statehood should be approved by a two-thirds majority of the members of the Council of 
the Nation, Nationality or People concerned, and it should be supported by a majority 
vote in the referendum (Article 47). But in majority of cases, except in SNNP region’s 
few ethnic groups (which have zonal council for their ethnic constituency), most of the 
ethnic groups do not have their own separate councils, paradoxically it is only those who 
have been allowed to have their own self-administrative constituency that have a 
council, but those ethnic groups (or ‘nations, nationalities and people’ as constitutionally 
named) without self-administrative constituency do not have a council that supposed to 
approve their demand for self-administration constituency. For example, in 
Benishangul-Gumuz regional states a demand by the Benishangul (or Berta) elite to 
have their own council was not entertained for political discussion either in the regional 
council or in the HF. The Benishangul people did not have their own council to approve 
the demand until 2003 and the state council, which was established by the five ethnic 
groups (the Benishangul people have only 28 out of 80 seats), rejected their demand. 
This created a strained relationship between the Benishangul elite and the Gumuz elite 
that severely thwarted the operation of the regional state and also the hostility has been 
deepening not only between the political elite’s of the two groups, but also among the 
ordinary people of Benishangul and Gumuz (A member of zonal executive from Berta, 
Interviewee 8 2002: 10; An Elder from Berta, Interviewee 7 2002:18; (A regional 
official, from Gumuz, 1, 2002: 1). A similar problem is occurring in the SNNP regional 
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state, some of these were the Sidama group has resented against the SNNP’s council 
decision to deny them the ownership of Awassa city, the North Omo zone disintegrated 
in a bloody conflict due to the inability of the four ethnic groups to agree in a single 
council, the Gamo and Gofa elites are continuing their demand for a separate zonal 
administration and their own separate council.  
 
Thus, the constitutional pledges for a right to self-administration or secession is more of 
rhetoric than an achievable promise for many of the ethnic groups, as the long and 
complex procedures seem difficult to fulfill. In the future, however, it would be used for 
facilitating and legitimizing an exit for a region that could build a capability to do so. 
Especially, there is a widespread suspicion that, Tigray could be the first candidate to 
ask for secession, if the hegemonic position of the Tigray elite in ruling Ethiopia is in 
jeopardy. It may be for such purpose that article 39 that pledges the right of secession is 
highly protected from any alteration and it needs the approval of all the regional states 
for its amendment, as it is declared in the constitution (Article 105) that article 39 which 
is included in ‘fundamental principles of the constitution’ can not be changed without 
the approval of all of the councils of the regional states, but to show a revealing 
comparison, article 47 of the constitution that declares the establishment of the nine 
regional states can be changed by the approval of a two-third of the councils of the 
regional states. Currently, however, the rhetoric of secession has produced two great 
challenges. First, it becomes an incentive for various ethnic groups to demand for a 
separate self-administrative constituency and separate regional state that has resulted for 
bloody conflict, displacement and ethnic hostility. Second, the rhetoric has generated a 
big voice that denounced the ‘secession right’ as a hidden motive to destroy the 
Ethiopian state. However, such big denunciation has created confusion among many 
ethnic groups who are suspicious regarding the motive behind the denunciation. And the 
ruling group successfully maneuvered the denunciation as an opposition to the rights of 
ethnic groups for self-administration, thus it restlessly worked for deepening the 
suspicion in order to capitalize political support from various ethnic groups for its 
hegemonic interest.     
 
 
4. A flawed structure: a concentration of power on the chief executive of the federal 
government 
The constitution (Article 45) states that Ethiopia should have a parliamentarian form of 
government in which the majority political party or a coalition of political parties that 
has the greatest number of seats in the parliament, namely the HPR have a power to 
establish a government. This constitutional design upholds a ‘winner takes all’ approach. 
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This may be a very unsuitable political system for a multiethnic society that requires a 
coalition or power-sharing arrangement. A federal system in a multiethnic society could 
be well suited to a negotiated and consociational-like arrangement that attempts to 
construct unity in diversity (Elazar 1987; Watts 1999; Agranoff 1998; Lijphart 2002) As 
a result, a concentration of power on a single winner could not satisfy the various 
interests and needs of the numerous and diverse communities of multiethnic Ethiopia. 
Constitutionally, the winner part in the federal parliament (also similar in the regional 
states), has very extensive power and responsibilities, some of these are: 
 
• Responsible for appointing the prime minister who becomes a head of the 
government, leader of the cabinet and the commander-in-chief of the armed force.  
(Article 76). 
• Responsible for suggesting nominees for ministerial posts. 
• Supervision over the implementation of the country’s foreign policy. 
• Selects and submits for approval to the House of Peoples’ Representatives 
nominations for posts of Commissioners, the President and Vice-President of the 
Federal Supreme Court and the Auditor General. 
• Appoints high civilian officials of the Federal Government other than those referred 
above. 
• Supervises the conduct and efficiency of the Federal administration and takes such 
corrective measures as are necessary. 
 
The majority party in the legislative always assumes an exclusive control of the 
executive and judiciary branches of the federal as well as the regional governments and 
thus the winning party assumes a total dominance of all branches of government, which 
is very unsuitable for a feature of multiethnic society, because federal arrangements in 
multiethnic would require either a coalition power centers or various centers of power. 
Many scholars, however, are uncertain regarding the efficiency and viability of an ethnic 
coalition arrangement or a proliferation of power centers in a polity (King 1982; 
Horowitz 1985, Elazar 1995). King, for example, argues that ‘a political system within 
which each power is precisely checked by another would not appear to be a feasible 
system at all…a political system in which each social force is nicely blocked by some 
others, seems to represent a non-system, not a system- more anarchy than a polity’ (King 
1982: 64). Horowitz also claims that ‘the assumption that elites in divided societies are 
likely to be more tolerant of other ethnic groups or less inclined to pursue advantage for 
their own group is extremely dubious’ (Horowitz 2002: 21). Thus, he claims that 
creating and sustaining coalition in divided societies is a very difficult task, but, of 
course, not impossible. In his empirical investigation, Horowitz, finds out that ‘educated 
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elites in some countries to be less ethnocentric than their followers, in others more, in 
some others neither less nor more, and in still others more with respect to some groups 
and less or the same with respect to other groups’ (Ibid.). However, in multiethnic 
Ethiopia in which autocratic rule is a norm, not an exception, it has been proved futile to 
quell ethnic or regional demands in centralized autocracy. The parliamentary system of 
governance based on the ‘winner takes all’ principle would not be a viable prototype to 
Ethiopia that exhibits variations in political development, tradition of statehood, cultural 
assortments and ethnic and language configurations.  
 
Furthermore, the constitution gives a strong power to the executive, particularly to the 
Prime Minister. The power of the Prime Minister in Ethiopia is unprecedented: he 
controls the armed force, the cabinet (the executive) is accountable to him; he is a head 
of a party that is a majority in the parliament or the legislative (90 percent majority from 
1995 to 2005 and two-third majority since May 2005). As the constitution (Article 74) 
gives him a power to select and recommend to the HPR an appointment of 
Commissioners, the President and Vice-President of the Federal Supreme Court and the 
Auditor General, he has a significant power in influencing the judiciary and other 
important institutions that should be vital for checks and balances in the federal systems. 
Moreover, since the President and Vice-President of the Federal Supreme Court are 
serving as a president and vice-president respectively in the Council of Constitutional 
Inquiry that have powers to investigate constitutional disputes, (Article 82 and Article 
84), hence, the prime minister has a greater influence to interfere with the function of 
constitutional inquiry. This makes the power of the prime minister in Ethiopia 
uncontrolled and unchecked by the executive, legislative judiciary and other federal or 
regional institutions. For instance, recently, connected to the May 2005 election, the 
Prime Minister declared an unconstitutional emergency law, but no federal institution 
has been able to interfere to challenge him, as there is no such constitutional power 
delegated to other federal o regional institutions. When the opposition party brought the 
case into the court, the issue was decided in favor of the Prime Minister. This is an 
example of a unconstitutionality3 that was backed by the court in favor of the Prime 
Minister by deliberately disregarding the constitutional decree that states, ‘it [the 
Council of Ministers] has the power to declare a state of emergency; in doing so, it shall, 
within the time limit prescribed by the Constitution, submit the proclamation declaring a 
state of emergency for approval by the House of Peoples’ Representatives (Article 77). 
Thus, the court shockingly favored the Prime Minister’s authoritarian and 
                                                          
3  Fasil Nahum, a legal advisor to the Prime Minister in press interview, June 2005 explained that the 
emergency decree was unconstitutional.  
 
12  
unconstitutional action mainly because the court in Ethiopia is operating under a 
complete influence of the executive, particularly the Prime Minister.  
 
In addition, the constitution does not put limit on the term of the Prime Minister, who 
has much power, but a term limit (for two terms) was placed on the post of a President, 
who has only a ceremonial power (Article 70). This is a very intriguing and deceptive 
constitutionally decree; in principle term limit should be made on the tenure of the 
executive in order to discourage a tendency of autocracy and power abuse by the power 
holder due to a longer tenure in power, but in the Ethiopia case the tenure of the 
executive (the great power holder) has been made infinite whereas the term limit was 
made on the non-executive, non-powerful and very ceremonial President. It should have 
been the other way round, if the purpose is it to limit abuse of power by the power 
holder.              
 
At the same time, the judiciary branch is also highly dependent on the executive body. 
The court system is structured in a very susceptible manner to the interference of the 
executive branch as the Prime Minister and his majority party in the parliament is 
responsible for the appointments of judges, the President and Vice-President of the 
Supreme Court. All the powers allocated to the parliament are indirectly allocated to the 
prime minister, as the prime minister is the head of the majority party in the parliament. 
Thus, the parliament is simply a rubber-stump to the executive body. Constitutionally, a 
majority party in the parliament always belongs to the PM and therefore expected to 
endorse the PM’s selection of the president and the vice-president of the Federal 
Supreme court that has supreme judicial authority in the country. On this point, articles 
78 and 80 of the constitution declare that ‘Supreme Federal judicial authority is vested in 
the Federal Supreme Court; the Federal Supreme Court shall have the highest and final 
judicial power over Federal matters and; the Federal Supreme Court has a power of 
cassation over any final court decision containing a basic error of law’.  
 
Although the constitution declares that judges should exercise their functions in full 
independence and should be directed solely by the law, the Judicial Administration 
Council, which has a power to remove judges due to violation of disciplinary rules or on 
grounds of gross incompetence or inefficiency, is accountable to the parliament as its 
decision to remove a judge should be approved by a majority vote in the parliament 
(Article 79). The Prime Minister also has a tremendous influence in the operation of the 
Judicial Administration Council, because the Council is operating within the federal 
government executive structure. The Council has responsibilities to assess and 
determine code of professional conduct and discipline as well as transfer of judges of 
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any court.  Besides, concerning appointment of other federal judges, the federal Judicial 
Administrative Council has a responsibility to select candidates that should be 
acceptable to the PM, because the Constitution declares that: ‘Regarding other Federal 
judges, the Prime Minister shall submit to the House of Peoples’ Representatives for 
appointment candidates selected by the Federal Judicial Administration Council’ 
(Article 81). The federal Judicial Administration has also a responsibility to give its 
views and recommendations to the regional states in nomination of their judges (Article 
81). Hence, cumulatively, the gist of the mater is that all key judicial powers are at the 
mercy of the Prime Minister or the head of the executive branch of the federal 
government.   
 
More critically, the Ethiopian federal project suffers from the absence of an independent 
constitutional interpretation procedure. The constitution states that the HF has the power 
to interpret the Constitution (Article 62, 1), but the HF is a political institution as its 
members are elected or appointed from elected party members, besides its members are 
strongly connected to and influenced by the winner party in the government. As a result, 
the power to interpret the constitution can certainly fall down into non-independent and 
partisan arm of a government. In addition, the Council of Constitutional Inquiry that was 
given powers to investigate constitutional disputes would be organized by the HF and 
also expected to submit its recommendations to the HF. Making the matter worse the 
President and the Vice-President of the Federal Supreme Court would become a 
President and Vice-President of the Council respectively. As argued above, the PM has a 
tremendous influence in the appointment of the presidents of the Federal Supreme 
Court, thus he can get a direct influence in the operation of the Council of Constitutional 
Inquiry that could undermine its independence and impartiality. 
 
 
5. Ambiguities in the constitution 
First, there is ambiguity in the constitution that declares the rights of self-government for 
every ethnic group in Ethiopia, which are amounted to be about 80 ethnic groups, but 
only nine self-government regions were established and the constitution itself create 
hindrance for materializing the rights for self-government for other ethnic groups by 
making very complicated and difficult procedures to request and establish self-
government.   
 
Second, the constitution did not make or present any convincing explanation to form the 
nine regional states; the criteria are not clear or not consistently applied. No clear 
explanation was provided for the action in compacting the numerous (more than 60) 
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ethnic groups with 12 million people in southern Ethiopia in a single regional self-
government structure, whereas ethnic groups with lesser population and lesser viability 
with higher ambiguity such as the Harari people were provided a right to exercise their 
self-governing opportunities in the region where they constitute less than 10 percent of 
the populations.   
 
Third, there is ambiguity concerning the sovereignty power, the constitution (article 8) 
declares that: ‘All sovereign power resides in the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of 
Ethiopia’. This may be tantamount to say that individuals or people are not recognized 
without their ethnic domain which can also contradict with the fundaments of human 
rights provisions of the same constitution which declares: ‘Human rights and freedoms, 
emanating from the nature of mankind, are inviolable and inalienable’ (Article 10). The 
constitution itself is a cause for the curtailment of the rights of individual as it upholds 
the sovereignty of groups. It emphasizes the precedent of group rights over individual 
rights, besides since the courts are not properly structured and function to enforce the 
bill of rights, thus this may reflect a deficit in the application of the provisions human 
rights declarations.   
 
Fourth, there is ambiguity regarding what ‘nation, nationality and people’ entails or 
represents. Very fundamental and significant rights, for example, have been granted to 
every ‘nation, nationality and people’, but actual power of executive, legislation and 
other authorities are granted to the regional states, not to the ‘nation, nationality and 
people’. ‘Nation, nationality and people’ are not the constituting part of the federal 
structure; rather the regional states are the constituting part of the federal arrangement. 
To make an illustration, in the SNNP regional state there are about 60 ‘nation, 
nationalities and people’, but only one regional state that is the constituent part of the 
federal system.   Since ethnic-groups or ‘nations, nationalities and peoples’ as a uni-
group or multi-group establish the regional states, there is clear distinction between the 
two levels of arrangements that the constitution doesn’t make any attempt to make a 
separation. Rather the constitution gave very ambitious rights to the ethnic groups (or 
‘nations, nationalities and peoples, as named in the constitution) but without making any 
attempt how these rights would be utilized in accordance with the professed federal 
system of governance. The constitutional rights provided to an ethnic group in a uni-
ethnic regional state can be directly translated into the rights of the regional state, but the 
issue would become difficult in a multi-ethnic regional state. As it was presented in the 
constitution that the ethnic groups or the ‘nation, nationality and people’ are much more 
focused on their insular interest whereas the regional states are expected to operate 
beyond such insular and affective attachment. However, the ‘nation, nationality and 
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people’ organize and control the regional state government. Thus, the regional state’s 
government structure in multi-ethnic state has become an arena for competition between 
inward-looking and parochial interests that are discernibly solidified by the 
constitutional pledges. Contrary to many federal arrangements, the Ethiopian model 
gives the right to leave the federal structure to the so-called ‘nations, nationalities and 
people’ (Article 39), but not to the constituting federal states, however, ‘nations, 
nationalities and people’ are not the constituting part of the federal structure (Article 47). 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
Generally, Ethiopian federal system suffers from a concentration of power on the federal 
executive branch. Concentration of power on the federal government executive and 
particularly on the PM can make the federal arrangement close to a dictatorship (Abbink 
1998:168). The EPRDF is powerful at all level of governance and TPLF is the dominant 
force in EPRDF. The prime minister, Meles Zenawi, and his close allies are dominating 
the TPLF; therefore this concentration of power in a few elite close the PM has made the 
Ethiopian federal exercise more of a caricature to mask authoritarianism. Consequently, 
the Ethiopian federal system suffers from the principle to limit the power of government, 
independence of judiciary and constitutional governance or constitutionalism. According 
to Vestal, Ethiopia is under a new form of authoritarianism, the ‘subtler tyrannies’ of the 
post-Cold War World. (Vestal 1999:188). The Ethiopian federal system reflects a scanty 
power of the regional states, the right to secede from the federation, absence of 
independent judiciary, absence of independent constitutional interpretation, fiscal power 
compete concentration on the federal government, superfluous constitutional 
ambiguities and concentration of power on an individual leader. It is a facade federal 
system, but with a caricature to misinform and pervert righteousness.  
 
The constitution shows either mere intentions or a cover for deception. As Paul B. 
Henze argues that the Ethiopian constitution contains glaring contradictions, such as ‘the 
right to secede’ and ‘federation’, which a concern seems to be the security of the regime, 
rather than the practicability and consequence of the constitution (Brietzke 1995: 35). 
Although democratic and human rights are unconditionally promised in the constitution, 
there is little tolerance for alternatives as those who come into conflict with the 
TPLF/EPRDF are hit just as severely by extra-legal executions, torture and 
imprisonment without trial (Pausewang 2002: 235).  Although the constitution declares 
that courts shall be independent and judges shall ‘exercise their function in full 
independence’ and protected from unduly removal, there have been many cases in which 
judges were removed for political reasons (Young 1999: 330). 
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It is important to give a possible explanation for such grave deficiencies of the 1994 
constitution. The constitutional defect was the progeny of the defect of the transitional 
charter that was exclusively authored by TPLF/EPRDF with a minor role from other 
ethnic organizations like OLF (which withdrew from the transitional government after a 
year) but with the exclusion of many pertinent groups and most importantly without a 
genuine and free participation of the Ethiopian people. The transition charter that was 
produced in such flaw process became a code of conduct for the subsequent political 
process such as drafting of the constitution and drawing of the ethnic states. These two 
important functions were the basic foundations of the federal system in Ethiopia, but 
sadly, both of theses key functions were carried out at the process that did not involve a 
participation and negotiation of all parties that need to be considered. Most importantly, 
the TPLF/EPRDF-controlled transitional government exclusively monopolized the 
constitutional drafting process, as it was stipulated in the Charter that the transitional 
government was responsible to draw up a draft constitution (Article Ten, the 
Transitional Charter, 1991). Consequently, the Constitutional drafting commission was 
established in 1993 and produced a discussion booklet, which was discussed in public 
meetings, international symposium and diplomatic missions. But as the whole process 
was controlled by the EPRDF, no substantive feedbacks were included from the public 
discussion. The key players were constrained from the discussion. The public discussion 
was simply an uninformed and uncritical deliberation that was designed for ‘a 
perversion of education into propaganda’ (Vestal 1999: 91). It was simply an attempt to 
secure political hegemony of the TPLF/EPRDF through a veneer of democracy. As 
Harbeson argues, ‘since 1991 Ethiopia has acquired virtually all the forms of democracy 
but little of its substance’ (Harbeson 1998: 62). 
  
Consequently, the draft constitution was ratified in 1994 by the constitutional assembly 
which was elected from the people in which EPRDF controlled almost 95 % of the 
members. The oppositions completely boycotted the election. The process starting from 
assigning the commission to electing the constitutional assembly and ratifying the 
constitution was absolutely dominated by the ruling party. It was purely a façade that 
masked an authoritarian regime (Ibid. p. 66).   
 
This signifies the fail of the second (the first was the transitional charter) grand 
covenant, which could have been the very basic foundation of the federal pact. Many 
groups such as nearly all the opposition groups, the civil society movements, and the 
Ethiopian in Diaspora overwhelmingly rejected the Constitution. As a result, the 
constitution has become the document of the ruling party and its affiliated organizations. 
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It was an imposed ‘federal covenant’ on the Ethiopian people without their genuine 
participation and consent. It was implemented in a manner completely dominated by a 
power at the center in collaboration with the co-opted elites at the regional as well as 
local levels and the unfairly privileged very tiny ethnic groups. Thus, the 1994 Ethiopian 
constitution is denoted as the constitution of the TPLF/EPRDF because it only reflects 
the ideology and wishes of the TPLF-led EPRDF. To conclude, I will cite from John 
Young, a close examiner of and more sympathetic to the TPLF, who states: 
‘Constitutional making under the EPRDF has little in common with the bargaining, 
trade-offs, and compromises that usually typify such process; rather it reflects the 
weakness of the country’s democratic institutions, the political objectives of the 
governing party, and its position of dominance with a state where serious opposition had 
been crushed or marginalized (Young 1998: 195).    
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